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This article, deploying data from documentary sources,examines 
issues in Nigeria’s democratization project and the prospect of 
a Democratic Developmental State (DDS) in post-authoritarian 
Nigeria. Drawing from the radical theory of the state, it notes that an 
autonomous state is pivotal to a successful DDS in the global South. 
In the light of this and based on the review of Nigeria’s development 
and democratization history, the article argues and concludes that, 
given the non-autonomous character of the Nigerian state and the 
politics that it engenders, the prospects of a DDS in Nigeria in the 
nearest future are rather slim. 
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Introduction
The de-legitimization of the authoritarian developmental state in South-East 
Asia in the late 1990s and the emergence of populist-oriented developmental 
regimes in Latin America in the first decade of the twenty-first century would 
seem to have further awakened scholarly interests on the issue of democratic 
developmental state (DDS) outside the Global North. In November 2006, for 
instance, scholars from Africa, Asia and Latin America gathered in Kampala, 
Uganda to discuss no other issue than the feasibility of DDS in the Global 
South.1 The Kampala’s meeting and others of similar complexion have tended 
to underscore the increasing popularity of DDS in the development discourse of 
the global south. But, while studies that emanated from the outcomes of some 
of these meetings may, no doubt, have added to the bourgeoning literature2 
on DDS, there is still a need to further deepen the discourse on the feasibility 
of DDS in the Global South. It is against this background that this article 
examines the issues and prospects of DDS in post-authoritarian Nigeria. The 
article is partitioned into six sections. Following this introductory preamble is 
section two which clarifies and discusses the concepts that are central to this 
discourse. The section that follows undertakes a review of extant literature 
on the genealogy and ontology of DS and DDS. Section four historicizes the 
Nigerian State’s efforts at promoting development. This is followed by the 
examination of the democratization agenda of the state managers in post-
military Nigeria. The sixth section concludes the article.
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Conceptual Framework: What is democracy? What is development? 
In this article, the two major concepts whose clarifications are pivotal are 
democracy and development. However, it has to be stressed that the two 
concepts, to borrow Gallie’s3 elegant phrase, are essentially contested. In 
other words, they conjure multiple meanings and interpretations depending 
on the ideological predilection of the individual or institutions defining them. 
Instructively, this problem is even more pronounced with the concept of 
democracy. In the words of Przeworski et al: 
Almost all normatively desirable aspects of political life, and 
sometime even of social and economic life, are credited as definition 
features of democracy: representation, accountability, equality 
participation, dignity, rationality, security, freedom-the list goes on-
Indeed, according to many definitions, the set of true democracy is 
an empty set.4
However, broadly speaking, the definition of what democracy means in 
literature, would appear to have been framed from three broad theoretical 
perspectives. The first (Rousseauian) perspective, drawing from the Athenian 
model, puts citizens’ participation at the centre of the definition of democracy.5 
Writing within this school, two neo-Rousseauians, Guttmann and Thompson6 
view democracy, “as a form of government in which free and equal citizens 
(and their representative), justify decisions in a process in which they give one 
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible.” The 
second (Schumpeterian) approach to democracy views democracy in elitist-
terms.7 Indeed, a leading exponent of this school of thought, Schumpeter,8 
once remarks, “democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people 
actually rule in any real sense of the term, ‘people’ and ‘rule.’ Democracy 
means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule over them.” Viewed this way, therefore, elites are the 
principal actors in the Schumpeterian approach to democracy as they dominate 
the political process. Thus, in the Schumpeterian sense, the only right the 
citizens (the mass) have is throwing out the “rascals” periodically in free and 
fair electoral contest. The third (liberal) perspective conceives democracy in 
the context of constitutional guaranteeing of freedoms- free elections, free 
speech, free movement, free press etc.9 Thus, to the extent that individuals’ 
rights and liberties are constitutionally enshrined and guaranteed, proponents 
of the liberal approach contend that democracy exists.10
At this juncture, it is instructive to stress that, since the end of the 
Cold War; the hitherto sharp boundary between the foregoing approaches 
would appear to be non-existent as all now seems to have been subsumed under 
the hegemony of liberal democracy discourse.11 In the light of the foregoing 
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and given the fact that since the end of the Cold War, African states have 
embraced liberal democracy as a political corollary of economic liberalization, 
democracy, in this article, refers to liberal democracy. According to Weale,12
liberal democracy, on the one hand, provides the means by which the 
people govern, or at least elect their representatives who govern. On 
the other hand, it contains constitutional device, like separation of 
power or a system of checks and balances that limit the scope and 
application of the principle of majority rule.
Development, like the concept of democracy, also conjures different 
conceptualizations.13 Alluding to this, Iyayi14 contends that “development is 
conceived usually from the standpoint of specific social groups.” What are 
therefore obtainable, in literature on the subject, are schools of thought to the 
definition of what development means.15 Jhingan,16 for instance, identifies 
more than twenty of such approaches to development. To this end, Rodney17 
conceives it as the increasing capacity of a social group to regulate both 
internal and external relationship. Omoweh18 sees it as a process of change 
and accumulation of capital that enables society, the national economy and the 
people, to reproduce themselves, sustain their basic needs while ensuring an 
overall increasing socio-cultural, political and economic equality. Goldstein19 
views it “as the combined process of capital accumulation, rising per capita 
incomes (with consequent falling birthrates), the increasing of skills in the 
population, the adoption of new technological styles, and other related social 
and economic changes.” Instructively, what seems to be common to these 
exponents of development as transformation is that development depicts the 
independent capacity of a group (in the context of this article, a nation) to 
use its potentials to the maximum without hindrance from an outsider. These 
capacities according Iyayi20 include: capacity to regulate relationships among 
members and with outsiders; independent of both nature and other social 
groups and the ability to provide for the material, social and psychological 
needs of members of the social group.  Framed this way, development, for 
the purpose of this article, would suggest an outcome of sustained process of 
transformation of the material and human resources of Africa/Nigeria brought 
about by the increasing capacities of the people to shape and determine their 
destiny. 
Literature Review: Unbundling Developmental State/ Democratic 
Developmental State 
In this section, two tasks are undertaken. Firstly, an attempt is made to trace the 
origin of the concept of DS and DDS and secondly, the literature is explored in 
order to dissect the ontology of DS and DDS. However, it has to be stressed that 
Article: Adeniyi S. Basiru and Solomon O. Akinboye
Jebat  Volume 45 (1) (July 2018) Page | 36
in the new political economy literature, it is common to trace the origin of the 
concept of DS to Johnson21 who first introduced it in his path-breaking book, 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle. In this book, Johnson explains the miraculous 
recovery and growth of Japan following the devastating second world war. 
However, this article, in a radical departure, contends that the paradigm of DS 
arose in the 1960s, during the post-colonial countries’ search for a model of 
development, that was expected to lift them out of underdevelopment. Indeed, 
it was at this historical juncture that the modernization theory emerged as the 
leading paradigm for explaining the development conundrum of the countries 
that transited from colonialism. 
Framed within the context of evolution, modernization theory contends 
that development is synonymous with growth.22 Drawing from the post-war 
experience of West Germany, the proponents of the theory argue that growth 
emanating from modernization (mechanization, industrialization etc) would 
in the long run promote democracy. Therefore, what the new states needed 
was capitalist-driven democratization projects.23Indeed, according to a leading 
proponent of this view, Lipset,24 “the more well-to-do a nation is, the greater the 
chances that it will become and sustain democracy.” Based on cross-national 
quantitative comparative research, he found a positive linear relationship 
between levels of socioeconomic development and democratic development. 
As he puts it: “economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, 
high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the 
society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy, and it is a mark of efficiency 
of the total system.’’25 In a similar vein, Rueschmeyer26 et al also submit that 
capitalist development in general helps the rise of democracy by transforming 
the class structure. Putting their thesis further, they identify three classes of 
power vis: class power; state power; and transnational structures of power.27 
These three sectors according to them combined and interacted in varying ways 
and varying sequences to determine political developments. Put differently, 
the changes in the class and social structure caused by industrialization and 
urbanization are most consequential for democracy. However, as elegant as 
the Lipsetian framework and assumptions were, they could not anticipate the 
‘new authoritarianism’ that swept through the relatively industrialized Latin 
American countries, as well as explaining successful authoritarian capitalism 
that persisted for a long period in East Asia. It was against this background that 
the debates on the DS emerged in literature.28
Specifically, Johnson29 argues that Japanese ‘developmental state’ 
was a central element in explaining the country’s post-World War II ‘economic 
miracle’ In another work,30 Johnson provides four reasons why DS is a 
necessary condition for economic development, at least at a relatively early 
stage. One, an authoritarian regime is better able to regiment a population for the 
massive sacrifices necessary for early industrialization. Two, an authoritarian 
regime can be more efficient in achieving the goals of the initial stages of 
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industrialization, such as development of a solid infrastructure, large amounts 
of capital, great volumes of imported technology, and selection and expansion 
of the industrial base producing relatively simple manufactures at low prices. 
Three, an authoritarian regime can reduce policy fluctuations by insulating 
itself from pressures of various interests groups and avoid critical influence of 
an electoral cycle. Four, an authoritarian regime can forge or impose a national 
ideology for hard work and sacrifice for economic development. Such a regime 
may stress the moral claims of the state: national discipline, national unity, the 
importance of stability for national development and the mischievousness and 
decisiveness of politics.
Based on the foregoing parameters, Johnson31 defines a developmental 
or plan‐rational state “as one that is determined to influence the direction and 
pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development 
process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces 
to allocate economic resources.”What can be deduced from Johnson’s position 
is that growth is better fast track under the atmosphere of authoritarianism 
and state centralization. Put differently, a new state that desires economic 
development like Japan does not need democracy. Piecing this argument 
together, he posits:
What is required then is not necessarily a democratic state, but a 
developmental state. Without a developmental state, democratic 
or not, no contemporary developing society is likely to achieve 
developmental breakthrough. Successful developmental outcomes, 
both historically and in modern era, seem to have depended less 
on whether regimes have been democratic or not, and more on 
such factors as internal stability; on acceptability in international 
economic and political markets; on positive relations with dominant 
economies; on the relative autonomy of the state in both democratic 
and non-democratic politics; on sound infrastructure and competent 
administration; and on low levels of corruption.32
During the same era, other scholars pointed out the in-built weakness in 
Johnson’s strong state thesis.33 For instance, Zysman34 claims that the strong 
state-weak state continuum refers to an abstract capacity, and as such, it is 
not issue-oriented. He rather prefers to employ two characteristics of a strong 
state. Firstly, the state’s capacity to deny political access to unwanted groups; 
and secondly, the ability to select among market operation, and hence the 
ability to guide the economy.35 Evans,36 in his contribution to DS literature, 
introduces the concept of “embedded autonomy.” According to him, state 
autonomy is embedded in a concrete set of social ties that bind it to society. 
Embedded autonomy thus provides institutionalized channels for the continual 
negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies.37 Through this channel, 
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he submits that it is possible to link the state to particular social groups with 
whom it shares a joint project of transformation.38
African scholars also join the debate at a point in time. Mkandawire,39 
in his contribution like Evans does not see DS in institutional terms but rather 
in ideological terms. To him, “a developmental state is one whose ideology 
is developmentalist.”40 This kind of state, according to him, conceives its 
mission as one of ensuring economic development and its elite has the capacity 
to establish an ‘ideological hegemony’ and implement economic policies 
effectively.41 Joining issues with Mkandwire is Edigheji42 who adds other 
elements to the definition of DS. According to him, DS is “the promotion by 
the state of market-enhancing rather than market-repressing economic policies 
and a clear division of labour between the state and the private sector under the 
overall guidance of a super-ministry or state agency”.43
However, following the end of the Cold War, the erstwhile successful 
developmental states in Asia, in line with the prescriptions of the Breton wood 
institutions (BWIs), began to liberalize their polities in order to broaden the 
dividends of development.44What therefore emerged in these countries was a 
discourse on DDS. Instructively, the discourse soon moved to other areas in 
the Global South. In Africa, the debate was promoted by the BWIs within the 
agenda of bringing “governance back in” into Africa’s development discourse. 
Perhaps, it is in this wise that Mkadawire45 contends that discourses on DS after 
the Cold War, have revolved around two ideological orbits vis: the neoliberal 
state ‘roll back’ and the radical state ‘transformation’. The former, according 
to him, favours a technicist approach to development policy in which citizen 
democracy is replaced by consumer democracy. In other words, the neo-
liberal approach to DDS views citizens as consumers, clients and users whose 
access to government services is based on the ability to pay. Putting this in 
perspective, Boyte46 avers: 
When politics becomes the property of professional elites, bureaucrats 
and consultants, most people are marginalized in the serious work 
of public affairs. Citizens are reduced to, at most, secondary roles 
as demanding consumers or altruistic volunteers. Moreover, with 
the transformation of mediating institutions…, such as civil society 
think-tanks, [which] became technical service providers - citizens lost 
all stake and standing in the public world. Consequently, the question 
of democracy has largely neglected issues of economic justice - basic 
needs such as access to food, shelter, medical care and housing. In 
the absence of equal opportunity for all citizens to these essentials for 
human existence, the equality being stressed in liberal democracy is 
defeated.
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In contradistinction, the radical version of DDS, advocated by 
African radical scholars, in spite of the predatory character of the African state, 
supports a leading role for the state in the development process.47 Specifically, 
Mkandawire48 (2001:291) favours an autochthonous developmental state 
instituted via popular struggle rather than a model that is at variance with 
African experience. In this wise, therefore, a DDS refers to the political 
leadership and its institutional groups which enjoys a reasonable measure of 
autonomy from the society, but aligns with groups, classes and institutions that 
will facilitate the delivery of its set development objectives. Viewed this way, 
therefore, is Nigeria a DDS? Before examining this issue, it is imperative to 
put the country’s development trajectory in perspective. 
Nigeria’s Efforts at Development: A Pre-1999 Survey
Colonial rule in Nigeria, like in other areas, while it lasted, failed woefully in 
two critical areas. Firstly, it failed in the area of nation building and secondly, 
in the area of people’s empowerment.49 The successor state elites, conscious 
of this gap, promised to reverse the colonial order by reforming society. To be 
sure, the immediate post-independent ruling elites, perhaps, driven by the logic 
of modernization promised to reform the post-colonial economy for the purpose 
economic growth and development.50 Umezurike51 has categorized these 
agenda into two, vis: those that inadvertently aimed at promoting economic 
nationalism of the Nigerian state and those that were directly structured and 
oriented towards advancing market liberalization and state divestiture. In the 
first category, according to him, are: indigenization and Nigerianisation; land 
use reform; poverty alleviation etc. The author listed in the second category: 
austerity measures, economic stabilization programme, privatization and 
commercialization, the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy, Seven-Point Agenda and the Transformation Agenda. 
To be sure, in the first phase of the development agenda (1960-66), it 
is remarkable to note that the global ideological horse trading set the context 
for the choice of policy available to political leaders. It was, perhaps, realized 
that unhindered reliance on the great powers involved in ideological rivalry 
entailed some political risks for a weak nation.52 In fact, Nigerian first Prime 
Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa put the then scenario this way: 
At present, we lack the necessary capital and technical skill to develop 
our own resources by ourselves alone…. How are we to obtain help 
from outside and still keep free from being under the influence of 
one power bloc or another conscious of the dependent nature of the 
nation’s economy and the global ideological horse trading, weighed 
carefully the options available to the country.53 
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Given this conundrum, he believed that the best strategy for the furtherance 
of Nigeria’s economic growth at the time was import-substitution-
industrialization.54 Specifically, it was a policy directed primarily at attracting 
foreign investment, external public loans and grants without putting in jeopardy 
the country’s internal security and political independence. In the second phase 
(1966-80), the governing regimes adopted the strategy of state intervention in 
the economy. The principal objectives of the state at this stage were two folds, 
namely to provide basic infrastructure to accelerate growth, and moderate 
economic transactions in order to ensure social equity in the distribution of 
the fruits of development.55 It is instructive to note that during this phase, it 
appeared the country’s economy like those of its peers in Africa experienced 
marginal gain.56
However, by 1981, the second phase of the post-colonial economic 
reform ran out its full course as the country and its leadership lost the sovereignty 
to direct the economy to the BWIs.57 Since then, the political leadership has 
been pursuing a neo-liberal developmental state. It is instructive to note that 
by accepting the terms of the BWIs, the ruling elites in 1986 first launched 
the country into the era of neo-liberalism, where the Federal Government 
disinvests from the public sector.58 In the first phase of structural adjustment, 
the state redirected spending away from public-owned enterprises into debt 
servicing. By adopting policies of currency devaluation, trade liberalization, 
subsidy removal and privatization of private enterprises, the regime of General 
Babangida embraced the logic of a minimal state.59
Unfortunately, the reform soon generated its own contradictions and 
ultimately failed in delivery welfare to the people. For instance, the real per 
capital consumption deteriorated from 1,250 naira in 1987 to 1,150 naira in 
1995.60 In fact, the data in the NEEDS document indicate that the poverty level 
of the population increased from 27% in 1980 to about 70% in 1996 and by 
1999 to over 70%.61 Instructively, despite these obvious facts about the failure 
of SAP, the BWIs held on to the belief that the reform could not fail and if it 
did, it must have been as result of bad governance, neopatrimonialism and 
corruption.62 The solution thus lies in the enthronement of good governance 
and accountability. By accepting this position, the regime of General Abubakar, 
who succeeded General Abacha, launched the country into the post-adjustment 
phase. However, the regime, being a transitory one, though accepted the new 
agenda, believed that it would be better implemented in a democracy. Really, 
democracy did berth on the 29th May, 1999.
Post-Military Nigeria: The   State, Politics, Democracy and Development
As noted earlier in this article, central to the construction of DDS in any 
jurisdiction is the state.63 According to Skocpol,64 impetus to change comes 
from within the state structure. The import of Skocpol’s thesis here is that the 
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state is the locus of change in any society. However, it has to be stressed that 
the state being an abstract construct does not itself effect social change. To be 
sure, social change is activated by officials who are insulated from dominant 
social and economic interests in the society. These officials, according to 
Trimberger65 could be top government officials, the captains of industry, the 
high brass in the military and the leaders of political parties whose actions may 
not be driven by personal interests but by certain ideologies or nationalism. 
What could be inferred from the foregoing is that is state autonomity is a pre-
condition for constructing a DDS.66
Unfortunately, the states in Africa unlike some of be regarded as 
autonomous entities that are independent of powerful social forces This may be 
related to the manner in which the post-colonial state in Africa emerged under 
colonialism. Colonial rule in Africa had created a state form that was coercive 
but yet lacked legitimizing credential to act as a hegemonic force over society.67 
Putting this in perspective, Nnoli68 avers, “unlike the capitalist countries of 
Europe and America where the capitalist state emerged essentially to mediate 
the conflicts among the various classes, the African colonial state had the 
additional functions of establishing capitalism and holding down conquered 
people.” This, perhaps, explains why Ake69 refrains from referring to social 
formations in post-colonial Africa as independent states.  According to him, 
“in Africa, there are few social formations that are capitalistenough or socialist 
enough to be identifiable as clearly boasting the state form of domination.”70 
Perhaps, it is in this context that he theorizes that, “limited autonomy’ is the 
unique feature of the state in Africa.” Specifically, Ake posits that the limited 
autonomy of the post-colonial state in Africa from the contending social 
classes makes it vulnerable to be captured the non-state captors for the purpose 
of primitive accumulation. Putting the context that led to state capture in Africa 
in perspective, Adisa avers, 
independence came with the full adoption of colonial legacy. Most 
African countries created and recreated a political class whose narrow 
interest in development was not to transform their society but to build 
economic empires for themselves rather than improve the standards of 
living of their citizenry. The implications of this is that the ruling elite 
had to depend on state capture as a veritable means of accumulating 
capital.71
For instance, during Nigeria’s First Republic, the state laid prostrate to 
be captured by the politicians for building their precarious material bases. This 
provoked serious intra-elite conflict in which politics assumed the character of 
warfare. This development later paved the way for the specialists in violence, 
the military, to intervene in the country’s political process.72 Precisely, on 15 
January 1966, the Nigerian military abandoned their liberal constitutional 
Jebat  Volume 45 (1) (July 2018) Page | 42
Article: Adeniyi S. Basiru and Solomon O. Akinboye
role of defending the sovereignty of the nation to fill the vacuum created by 
the warring politicians. By their entrance into politics, they became the new 
overseers of wealth accumulation.73 Remarkably, the military class, even 
though, unlike its political counterpart, enjoyed relative autonomy, in terms 
of taking major decisions on national economy,74 but nevertheless equally 
deployed state power at its disposal to feather the nest of its members on the 
one hand and those of the indigenous capitalists as well as foreign capitalist on 
the other hand.75
Indeed, for twenty-nine years (1966-79) and (1984-99) that the 
military and their civilian collaborators held sway; they did not only deprive 
the people of their democratic rights but also deny them the right to choose the 
development path that suits them. One example suffices here. In 1985, when 
General Ibrahim Babangida, the country’s sixth military ruler at the height of 
the country debt crisis, threw the IMF debate open to the citizen, people were 
happy that the era of development dictatorship was over. Sadly, their happiness 
later paved way for despair as the regime surreptiously went ahead to accept 
the IMF package despite the rejection of the proposal by the citizens.76
Following the end of military rule on May 29th, 1999,77 the politicians 
who had been guillotined for fifteen years moved into the saddle with the 
expectation that development dictatorship would pave way for participatory, 
citizen-oriented development. Has this happened? We will come to this soon. 
At this juncture, it is instructive to note that in the post-authoritarian order, 
political parties became the central locus of politics. On May 29, 1999, the 
People Democratic Party (PDP), one of the three registered parties produced 
the president, having won the presidential election in February of the same 
year. The party also won majority of seats in the national parliament. By this 
development, the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and his party became the 
custodians of state power and were thus expected to be driving policies that 
would engender development in the country. In his New Year message to his 
countrymen on January 1, 2000, Obasanjo remarks:
In answering the call of service, we see it as our duty not to let you 
down. Your expectations have been our goal. And it will continue to 
be so for as long as we continue to enjoy your trust and confidence.78
Unfortunately, the party and the state were soon hijacked by powerful interests 
within and outside the country.79 One area in which this scenario has been 
pervasive is in the area of development agenda setting. At the inception of 
the new order, the regime and the party rather than nurturing the culture of 
participatory development reverted back to the old way of deciding the 
development needs for the people. As a matter of fact, the regime became 
the architect of the neo-liberal agenda under the guise of globalization.80 To 
be specific, during his first term in office, his shuttle diplomacy across the 
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world was motivated by the resolve to attract foreign investment.81 At home, he 
supervised numerous reforms. Indeed, under his watch, the telecommunication 
sector was deregulated; he also fast tracked the privatization and sales of many 
‘moribund’ public companies (NITEL, NiconNoga Hilton Hotel etc). In the 
oil sector, he saw to the deregulation of the downstream sector. In all of these, 
accusations were brandied against the president for supervising the sales of 
the national assets. To be sure, it was generally alleged that the privatization 
agenda was nothing but avenue for the party stalwarts and their backers in the 
private sector to further plunder the nation of its commonwealth.82 Perhaps, 
this accounted for the fierce struggle among the key gladiators in PDP to 
get the party’s presidential tickets in rounds of elections since 2003.83 One 
example suffices here. As the 2007 presidential approached, the then outgoing 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was widely reported in the media to have said 
that the approaching election would be do or die.84 Tragically, in such high-
wired politics, all means are legitimate. Party rules are hardly respected as 
the combatants deployed all sorts of missiles to secure victory in the race to 
controlling the state treasury. In the ruling party, the zoning principle that was 
conventionally agreed upon by the major stakeholders in 1998 was jettisoned 
towards the 2011 presidential election on the platter of high-wire politics.85 At 
the inter-party level, the struggle is even more intense. In fact, it has almost 
become a grund norm for the sitting president to deploy all manner of weapons 
to ensure that the opposition is stifled or sent into extinction. Most times, he 
does this through the manipulation of the electoral body. Indeed, if there is one 
area where Nigeria has faltered in the fourth republic, it is in the conduct of 
credible elections. To be specific, the 2007 elections, in Nigeria did not only 
weaken the integrity of the Nigerian nation but further dimmed  her image in 
the comity of civilized nations.86
From the foregoing, it is clear that democratic practice since the 
advent of democracy on May 29, 1999 in Nigeria has not really conformed 
to liberal values and ethos. Indeed, the country would seem to have been 
experiencing what Momoh87describes as “de-democratization.” To be sure, the 
liberal agenda embraced by the ruling party, PDP, until its defeat at the national 
level in 2015, has not promoted values that could nurture development in the 
country.88 Indeed, if objective parameters for evaluating democratic growth of 
a country are deployedto assess Nigeria’s democratic journey since 1999, it can 
hardly been described as a liberal democracy.  Observably, liberal democracy 
has not really translated into concrete dividends for the people.89 Putting this in 
perspective, Adebajo submits:
Over its nearly fifty years on independence Nigeria has been reduced 
to a giant collection of impoverished masses, a crumbling tower 
of Babel built on the rickety foundation of oil rents collected and 
squandered by its leaders. In spite of its enormous oil wealth, Nigeria 
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remains a largely poor country. Over 70% of its population still lives 
on less than $1 dollar a day, life expectancy is at an abysmal 47 years 
and the country ranked 159 out of 177 states on the UN Human 
Development index in 200.90
Concluding Notes: Any Prospect for the DDS in Nigeria?
This article set out to examine issues in Nigeria’s democratization cum 
development project and the prospect of a DDS in post-authoritarian Nigeria. 
In furtherance of this objective, it presented the conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks for the discourse, reviewed extant literature on DS/DDS in the 
Global South and most importantly, historicized Nigeria’s developmental cum 
democratization trajectories. From these reviews and analyses, it found out 
that a state that is autonomous of the powerful interests has the potential for 
promoting inclusive development in the society. It noted that in the case of 
Japan and the Asian Tigers, such a state was totalistic but at the same time, it was 
embedded in society.91 Although, Japan’s post-second world war authoritarian 
developmental state model, as noted, achieved miraculous growth for the 
country, yet it deprived the demos of their inalienable rights to participate in 
shaping the contour of development policies in Japan. This democratic gap, it 
was found out, is now filled by the DDS in which the autonomous state and 
its officials do not only serve popular interests but also have democratic and 
developmental orientations. In the Nigerian case, however, it was found out that 
neither the Nigerian state nor its political elites, even in the post-authoritarian 
era, beyond rhetoric, have developmental and democratic orientations. In the 
light of this findingcoupled with the reality of thenon-autonomous character 
of the Nigerian state and the politics that it engenders, the prospects of a DDS 
in Nigeria in the nearest future are rather slim. This may be due to the fact 
that civil society organizations thatought to be the vanguards for checking the 
excesses of the political elites and re-orientating themtowards becoming real 
‘democrats’ and ‘development enthusiasts’are either weak or have been co-
opted into the state’s neo-patrimonial machine. 
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